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            We consider a long-term average profit–maximizing admission control problem in an M/M/1 queuing system with unknown service and arrival rates. With a fixed reward collected upon service completion and a cost per unit of time enforced on customers waiting in the queue, a dispatcher decides upon arrivals whether to admit the arriving customer or not based on the full history of observations of the queue length of the system. Naor [Naor P (1969) The regulation of queue size by levying tolls. Econometrica 37(1):15–24] shows that, if all the parameters of the model are known, then it is optimal to use a static threshold policy: admit if the queue length is less than a predetermined threshold and otherwise not. We propose a learning-based dispatching algorithm and characterize its regret with respect to optimal dispatch policies for the full-information model of Naor [Naor P (1969) The regulation of queue size by levying tolls. Econometrica 37(1):15–24]. We show that the algorithm achieves an O(1) regret when all optimal thresholds with full information are nonzero and achieves an [Formula: see text] regret for any specified [Formula: see text] in the case that an optimal threshold with full information is 0 (i.e., an optimal policy is to reject all arrivals), where N is the number of arrivals.more » « less
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            Soner, Mete (Ed.)We develop a backward-in-time machine learning algorithm that uses a sequence of neural networks to solve optimal switching problems in energy production, where electricity and fossil fuel prices are subject to stochastic jumps. We then apply this algorithm to a variety of energy scheduling problems, including novel high-dimensional energy production problems. Our experimental results demonstrate that the algorithm performs with accuracy and experiences linear to sub-linear slowdowns as dimension increases, demonstrating the value of the algorithm for solving high-dimensional switching problem. Keywords. Deep neural networks, forward-backward systems of stochastic differential equations, optimal switching, Monte Carlo algorithm, optimal investment in power generation, planning problemsmore » « less
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            Variational quantum Monte Carlo (VMC) combined with neural-network quantum states offers a novel angle of attack on the curse-of-dimensionality encountered in a particular class of partial differential equations (PDEs); namely, the real- and imaginary time-dependent Schrödinger equation. In this paper, we present a simple generalization of VMC applicable to arbitrary time-dependent PDEs, showcasing the technique in the multi-asset Black-Scholes PDE for pricing European options contingent on many correlated underlying assets.more » « less
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            Forcing finite state mean field games by a relevant form of common noise is a subtle issue, which has been addressed only recently. Among others, one possible way is to subject the simplex valued dynamics of an equilibrium by a so-called Wright–Fisher noise, very much in the spirit of stochastic models in population genetics. A key feature is that such a random forcing preserves the structure of the simplex, which is nothing but, in this setting, the probability space over the state space of the game. The purpose of this article is, hence, to elucidate the finite-player version and, accordingly, prove that N-player equilibria indeed converge toward the solution of such a kind of Wright–Fisher mean field game. Whereas part of the analysis is made easier by the fact that the corresponding master equation has already been proved to be uniquely solvable under the presence of the common noise, it becomes however more subtle than in the standard setting because the mean field interaction between the players now occurs through a weighted empirical measure. In other words, each player carries its own weight, which, hence, may differ from [Formula: see text] and which, most of all, evolves with the common noise.more » « less
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